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The size of a jurisdiction is crucial in determining the efficiency, equity or 
efficacy  of  environmental  regulations.  However,  jurisdictions  are  usually 
taken  to  coincide  with  political  boundaries  even  if  environmental 
externalities  may  transcend  them.  This  paper  illustrates  the  design  and 
implementation of a Choice Modelling experiment to determine the spatial 
distribution of environmental benefits of Kings Park (Western Australia). 
The objective is to understand if federal, state or local resources are the 
appropriate  form  of  funding  a  conservation  policy.  Results  indicate  that 
there  are  interstate  spillovers  of  benefits,  hence  justifying  federal   2 
contributions  to  Kings  Park.  They  also  show  that  some  benefits  are 
homogeneously spread within Western Australia, and this is an indication 
that state funding is also appropriate. Other benefits are distance-dependent; 
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1. Introduction 
What  is  the  optimal  size  of  a  jurisdiction  for  setting  environmental 
standards? The question is largely unexplored. Most applied and theoretical 
analysis takes political boundaries ─the geographical limits within which 
authority is exercised─ as given (see, for instance, Shapiro and Petchey, 
1997, Sigman, 2005). However, the optimal size of a jurisdiction ─the limits 
within  which  authority  should  be  exercised─  depends  on  the  spatial 
spillovers  of  environmental  costs  and  benefits.  There  is  no  reason  for 
political  boundaries  and  these  geographical  spillovers  to  correspond.  In 
practice,  defining  a  jurisdiction  is  severely  constrained.  Nonetheless, 
identifying the optimal size of a jurisdiction indicates which administrative 
boundaries most closely match the optimal jurisdiction. In other words, to 
understand whether federal regulation is preferable to state intervention, it is 
necessary to establish the geographical limits of externality spillovers.  
Unfortunately, there are serious limitations on the ability to detect the 
extent of spatial spillovers. For instance, environmental benefits and costs 
may not depend on the direct use of resources, and estimating the utility 
impact of environmental changes cannot solely rely on observed behaviour. 
Is  it  possible  to  use  stated  preference  techniques  to  determine  the 
geographical extent of externality spillovers? This has never been the focus 
of  Contingent  Valuation  (CV)  or  Choice  Modelling  (CM)  studies;  their 
primary  goal  is  the  estimation  of  environmental  benefits  or  costs  in   4 
monetary terms. These techniques are controversial and their ability to truly 
capture environmental preferences is subject to ample criticism. Blamey et 
al.  (1995),  for  instance,  argue  that  private  and public  concerns  motivate 
answers to CV questions. In a CV setting, they argue, respondents consider 
the  interests  of  the  wider  community,  and  act  as  ‘citizens’  other  than 
consumers; hence, CV does not provide information that can be used in 
cost-benefit analysis. How wide is ‘the wider community’? Does it coincide 
with local, state or federal political boundaries?  If Blamey et al.’s criticism 
is correct (but see Curtis and McConnell, 2002 for a contrary opinion), it 
would  be  possible  to  use  stated  preference  techniques  to  provide 
information on the existence of preferences over geographical regions. This 
information  can  then  been  used  to  identify  the  optimal  jurisdiction  and 
contrast it to the actual level of policy intervention.  
This  article  illustrates  the  CM  technique  applied  to  the  task  of 
identifying the spatial distribution of the environmental benefits of Kings 
Park & Botanic Gardens (hereafter KP), in Perth, Western Australia. The 
CM application uses two samples, drawn respectively within the boundaries 
of  the  park’s  jurisdiction  and  outside  these  boundaries.  Two  ways  of 
incorporating  spatial  heterogeneity  in  the  econometric  model  are  also 
compared. The results of the CM application provide useful information on 
the appropriate level of environmental regulation and funding for KP.   
The rest of the paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 discusses   5 
the relationship between the efficiency, the equity, and the effectiveness of 
regulations  ─both  federal  and  state─  and  the  spatial  distribution  of 
environmental  externalities.  Section  3  highlights  the  methodological 
challenges  that  the  heterogeneous  distribution  of  environmental  benefits 
pose  on  CM.  Section  4  provides  a  brief  summary  of  the  KP’s  survey. 
Section 5 shows and discusses the results of the CM application. Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2. Optimal environmental regulation and spillover effects. 
Efficacy, efficiency and equity guide the design, the implementation, the 
enforcement, and the assessment of environmental policies. Federal laws are 
usually advocated on efficacy and equity terms (Oates, 1999):  
• State  agencies  may  not  be  effective  whenever  environmental 
degradation is a trans-boundary problem; 
• Federal intervention assures equal enforcement within industries, firms 
and communities.  
The efficacy, efficiency and equity arguments can also justify decentralised 
environmental policies: 
• Local authorities have better information on the nature of environmental 
problems; 
• State  regulations  can  be  tailored  to  take  into  account  economic, 
geographical and social conditions.    6 
Shapiro and Petchey (1997) highlight the main problem associated with this 
classical  view  of  state/federal  relations.  The  view  is  based  on  the 
assumption that governments have well-defined preference functions, which 
in turn requires either homogeneous preferences or that governments are 
omniscient Pigovian welfare maximisers. For instance, take the argument 
that  federal  regulation  is  better  in  case  of  trans-boundary  environmental 
issues. One way to deal with externality spillovers is to increase the size of 
the jurisdiction so as to internalise benefits and costs. Such an extension is 
justified on welfare terms if benefits (or costs) are uniformly distributed 
across  the  larger  jurisdiction.  However,  increasing  the  size  of  the 
jurisdiction  can  determine  a  welfare  loss  when  benefits  or  costs  are  not 
spatially homogeneous. The loss may arise either from the reduced capacity 
to differentiate local outputs, or because some businesses or communities 
are forced to take unwarranted actions. The welfare loss may also occur 
from the excess of costs (e.g. increase in income tax) over environmental 
benefits for some individuals. Hence, the relative efficacy, efficiency and 
equity of both centralised and decentralised environmental policies depend 
crucially on the degree of overlapping between the spatial distribution of the 
environmental  benefits  and  the  jurisdictional  limits  of  the  environmental 
policy. 
These arguments can be illustrated with reference to KP. The state of 
Western Australia supports the management of the park with around Au$8   7 
million  a  year,  the  equivalent  of  about  Au$8.00  per  West  Australian 
taxpayer.  A  small  fraction  of  this  amount (around  Au$300,000)  is  spent 
every year for the conservation of native bushland. Improving conservation 
strategies for native vegetation requires additional financial resources. Four 
funding schemes are possible:   
• the federal government sustains the whole costs of KP’s conservation. 
This funding option is efficient if, for every Australian resident, direct or 
indirect benefits from KP are positive. Otherwise, a welfare loss would 
arise  ─for  some  Australians,  conservation  costs  exceed  conservation 
benefits. Further, given that each taxpayer pays the same amount for 
KP’s conservation, this funding scheme is also fair if benefits from KP 
are  equally  distributed,  so  that  each  Australian  taxpayer  receives  the 
same amount of net benefits. 
• the  state  of  Western  Australia  (WA)  funds  the  conservation  of  KP’s 
bushland. State funding is efficient if benefits from KP do not spill over 
to other states. Otherwise, state funding would provide an insufficient 
level  of  conservation.  Also,  in  case  of  spillovers,  there  would  be  an 
equity issue because residents outside WA would benefit but would not 
pay  the  cost  of  KP’s  conservation.  Further,  if  preferences  over  KP’s 
conservation  are  not  homogeneous  within  WA, welfare  loss  is  likely 
because, for some WA taxpayers, conservation costs will be higher than 
conservation benefits.   8 
•  local authorities, such as councils or the park authority, should collect 
revenues to fund KP. Local funding is optimal if only users, or Western 
Australians living in the proximity of KP, gain from improved bushland 
management.  Otherwise,  this  funding  alternative  would  be  neither 
efficient nor fair.  
• Any  combination  of  the  three  levels  of  financial  support  could  be 
efficient  and  fair  if  benefits  are  not  equally  distributed  and  vary  as 
distance from KP increases.  
The  crucial  question  is  how  to  determine  if  KP  produces  benefits 
beyond its boundary, and eventually to identify the geographical limits of 
spillover effects. For some environmental problems, such as air pollution, it 
is  usually  possible  to  use  information  on  the  physical  effect  on  the 
environment to infer the loss ─or gain─ in human welfare. For some others, 
such as biodiversity conservation, there is no clear link between the spatial 
manifestation  of  the  phenomena  and  human  welfare.  Detecting  the 
geographical limits of benefits and costs cannot rely on some physical effect 
on the environment, and it is necessary to use stated preference techniques 
such as CM or CV to estimate the effects of an environmental change on 
human welfare. As noted above, the estimated effects could either be the 
respondent’s true welfare change or reflect the respondent’s assessment of 
the welfare effects on a wider community. Either way, the information from 
stated  preference  techniques  could  be  used  to  test  the  hypothesis  of   9 
homogeneous  environmental  benefits  ─or  costs─  over  the  sample 
population.  If  the  hypothesis  is  accepted,  the  sampled  population  ─the 
‘wider’ community of Blamey et al. (1995)─ is the appropriate level of 
environmental  regulation.  If  the  hypothesis  is  rejected,  the  sampled 
population is divided in smaller communities, and environmental regulation 
should be enforced only on homogenous groups.  
 
3. Spatial heterogeneity and environmental valuation. 
CM (also known as Choice Experiment) is basically “a structured method of 
data generation” (Hanley et al., 1998). It has been used in a large number of 
marketing, transportation and health care applications and it is increasingly 
applied in environmental valuation (Adamowicz, 2004). CM is based on 
Lancaster’s characteristic approach (Lancaster, 1966) and Random Utility 
Theory  (RUT).  According  to  these  approaches,  choice  behaviour  can  be 
described by:  
• a  function  which  relates  the  utility  Uij  of  each  alternative  j  for  an 
individual i to the set of the alternative’s attributes Qj and individual 
characteristics Si: 
Uij=Vij(Qj, Si) + εij                                                                                 (1) 
It  is  assumed  that  each  utility  value  can  be  partitioned  into  two 
components:  an  observable  or  systematic  component  Vij  and  an 
unobservable,  random  component,  εij.  Because  of  the  random   10 
component, the choice problem is inherently stochastic from the point of 
view of the researcher and it can be formulated in probabilistic terms. 
• a function linking the probability of an outcome to the utility associated 
with each alternative, which can be written as: 
Prij[j Qj, Qk, Si ]=Pr[(Vij+εij)> (Vik+εik)]               ∀ j≠k                (2) 
Individuals are assumed to choose the alternative that yields the highest 
utility. That is, alternative j is chosen if  Uij>Uik  for each j≠k. Equation 
(2) becomes: 
Prij[j  Qj, Qk, Si]=Pr[(εik-εij)< (Vij-Vik)]              ∀ j≠k                 (3) 
Depending on the distributional properties of the error terms and the design 
of  the  experiment,  parameters  of  the  deterministic  element  Vij  can  be 
estimated. In the most general form, Vij can be parameterized as follow: 
Vij=αj+ΣqβqQjq+ Σqsθqs QjqSis + Σjsφjs Sis + Σjsψjs QqQp                           (4) 
where αj, βq, γs, θqs, φjs and ψjs are parameters to be estimated conditional on: 
a) a vector of intercept terms for J-1 of the J choice options; b) the matrices 
of  choice  attributes  Q;  c)  interaction  terms  of  attributes  QqQp,  and  of 
attributes  and  individual  characteristics  QjqSis;  and  d)  the  interactions 
between intercept terms and individual characteristics.  
This  model  can  be  used  to  understand  how  and  if  preferences  for 
environmental  changes  vary  across  jurisdictions.  Spatial  heterogeneity  of 
preferences  can  be  basically  accommodated  in  two  ways.  The  first 
possibility is to specify the source of preference heterogeneity directly in the   11 
systematic element Vij of the utility function. The utility impact of a change 
in  an  environmental  attribute  ─that  is,  βq─  depends  on  a  variable 
representing spatial variability Si1: 
βqi= βq+  f(Si1)                                              (5) 
Si1 can be either a categorical variable identifying, for instance, to which 
jurisdiction the individual i belongs, or it can be a continuous variable, such 
as the individual’s distance from the environmental goods. If the error terms 
εij  in  equation  (1)  are  assumed  to  be  i.i.d.  extreme  value,  the  model 
corresponds to the classic Multinomial Logit (MuL) model (Kenneth, 2003). 
The  second  possibility  consists  in  superimposing  random  (unobserved) 
heterogeneity over the non-random (observed) heterogeneity of the previous 
method: 
βqi= βq+ f( Si1) + φi                                             (6) 
where φi is assumed to be normally distributed across individuals. Hence, 
the utility impact of environmental changes βqi depends on the distribution 
properties of the random element φi and individual characteristic Si1. This 
formulation is appropriate if there are reasons to believe that Si1 does not 
fully capture the source of preference heterogeneity. Assuming that εij are 
i.i.d. extreme value, the model is a Mixed Logit model (MiL) (Bhat, 2000). 
In order to make operational these behavioural models it is necessary 
to ensure that the sample represents the populations with regards to the Si1 
variable.  It  is  also  important  to  select  a  metric  for  Si1  by  balancing  its   12 
explanatory power with its measurability. Finally, no particular specification 
should be imposed on the function f(Si1). 
  
4. Background of the survey on Kings Park. 
The  CM  survey  was  designed  in  consultation  with  KP  management 
authority.  KP  extends  for  over  400  hectares  at  the  centre  of  the  Perth’s 
metropolitan  area.  It  consists  of  two  basic  landscapes:  bushland  and 
developed areas. The bushland ─320 hectares─ is mainly covered by native 
vegetation representative of the West Australian environment. It contains 
more than 450 species of plants, 70 types of birds, and one of the richest 
assemblies  of  small  reptiles  in  the  region.  The  developed  areas  contain 
recreation facilities, memorials, and a botanic garden. The park has a strong 
spiritual meaning for the Aboriginal people and is regarded as a place of 
commemoration,  education  and  recreation.  The  management  authority 
indicated  three  major  problems  in  KP’s  bushland:  weeds,  trampling  and 
fires.  Hence,  the  CM  study  aimed  to  help  the  management  authority  to 
prioritise its conservation efforts, and to investigate the possibility of raising 
funds  to  further  improve  the  bushland.  This  last  issue  was  particularly 
important, given that state funds for the park are controversial.  
The data generating mechanism of the CM technique requires:   
• the definition of the set of attributes Qj for the choice alternatives;  
• the identification of the possible levels for each attribute;   13 
• the  description  of  alternatives  and  attributes  in  meaningful  and 
comprehensible way; 
• the definition of the choice set J. 
Three  focus  groups  addressed  the  first  three  tasks.  They  concluded  that 
choice  options  should  be  described  in  terms  of  management  options  for 
KP’s bushland using four attributes ─ percentage of weed-free bushland, 
percentage  of  bushland  annually  destroyed  by  fires,  percentage  of  the 
accessible  bushland,  and  individual  contribution  to  support  the  preferred 
management strategy. Hence, a management option illustrates how the park 
authority can allocate its resources – eradicating weeds, preventing fire, or 
closing the bushland to the public. Table 1 shows the final set of attributes 
and attribute levels. Focus groups also gave important suggestions on the 
format and wording of the questionnaire. The choice set J was designed by 
systematically varying the attribute levels with a Graeco-Latin orthogonal 
procedure.  Respondents  were  presented  with  eight  choice  sets,  each 
composed by the current management strategy (status quo) and two other 
management options. Figure 1 gives an example of a choice set. 
Sampling  was  conducted  in  Western  Australia  (WA)  and  in 
Queensland (QLD). The WA population was stratified in 11 distance zones 
(table 2). From each distance zone, WA residents were randomly selected; 
then they were firstly contacted by phone and successively received the KP 
questionnaire by mail, with a pre-paid envelope to send it back. Random   14 
selection, phone contact and questionnaire posting were repeated to obtain a 
sufficient number of responses from each zone. 750 questionnaires were 
sent  and  324  were  returned  (42%  response  rate).  The  final  sample  is 
geographically  balanced  ─  it  mirrors  the  spatial  distribution  of  the  WA 
population  in  each  zone  (table  3).  The  WA  sample  allows  testing  the 
hypothesis that benefits from KP are homogeneous within the WA borders. 
The QLD sample consists of 42 interviews collected in Brisbane (QLD), 
and is based on a questionnaire different from the one used for the WA 
sample.  The  major  changes  involve  the  amount  of  information  on  KP 
provided to the respondents and the levels of the cost attribute. While WA 
residents  contribute  via  income  tax  to  fund  KP,  QLD  residents  do  not. 
Hence the status quo is necessarily different for the two samples. Despite 
these changes, there were serious self-selection problems. As a result, the 
QLD  sample  is  mostly  made  up  of  female,  well-educated  and  wealthy 
individuals  (table  3).  Furthermore,  the  sample  is  practically  made  up  of 
people living at the same distance from KP. It offers no spatial variability. 
However, it can still provide an indication of the existence of KP’s benefit 
spillovers across the boundaries of WA.  
 
5. Empirical results. 
Different specifications of the two behavioural models are possible. Spatial 
variability Si1 is specified using two distance metrics ─subjective travel time   15 
and geographical distance. The function f(Si1) takes several forms ─linear, 
log-linear, quadratic, and 2
nd, 3
rd, and 4
th order polynomial, and a simplified 
gravitational model (Beckmann, 1999). Two classes of statistical tests are 
used  to  select  the  best  specification.  The  Likelihood  Ratio  (LR)  test 
compares nested specifications (Louviere et al., 2000). The Vuong test is 
used  to  discriminate  among  non-nested  specifications  (Vuong,  1989). 
Whenever this test is inconclusive,  Clarke’s distribution-free test is used 
(Clarke  and  Signorini,  2003).  The  variables  entering  the  models  are 
distinguished in five groups:  
• the  Status  Quo  (SQ)  dummy  whose  coefficient  measures  the  utility 
associated with choosing the current management strategy for KP;  
• the interactions of individual characteristics ─income, education level, 
environmental attitude─  with the SQ;  
• the  choice  attributes  Weed,  Fire  and  Accessibility.  Their  parameters 
measure the marginal utility associated with the attribute change. In the 
MiL models, these parameters are assumed to be normally distributed; 
• the  interactions  of  the  choice  attributes  with  the  distance  variates. 
Because  variations  in  the  choice  attribute  change  the  possibility  of 
directly and indirectly benefiting from KP, distance is expected to take a 
different functional form for each choice attribute. 
• the  choice  attribute  COST,  measuring  the  individual  contribution 
required by each management option.    16 
WA sample.  
The  chosen  specifications  for  the  WA  models,  with  travel  time  and 
geographical distances, are reported in table 4. In terms of goodness of fit, 
the MiL models perform slightly better, as indicated by a larger Adjusted R
2 
(Louviere et al., 2000). The SQ is never significant, but respondents who 
believe more money should be spent on the environment (environmental 
attitude = 1) have a preference for changing the management strategy for 
KP. The attribute coefficients have the expected signs. The Weed attribute 
has  a  positive  sign,  indicating  respondents’  preferences  over  increasing 
efforts to control weeds in KP. The Weed parameter is also constant across 
models and distance metrics. The Fire attribute has negative coefficients, 
but  its  magnitude  and  statistical  significance  change  across  models  and 
distance metrics. The negative signs show that people prefer a reduction in 
fire  damages  in  KP’s  bushland.  The  Accessibility  attribute  has  either  a 
positive coefficient or it is not significant. A positive coefficient indicates 
that respondents prefer having access to the KP’s bushland. The parameters 
of the Cost attributes have the expected sign and are very similar across the 
models and distance metrics. 
Figure 2 depicts the effect of distance on the attribute implicit prices -
─the monetary value of the utility change produced by a 1% variation of the 
attribute. There are some regularities and some inconsistencies. No effect of 
distance  is  recorded  for  the  Weed  attribute.  No  matter  how  distance  is   17 
measured and how it enters the econometric model, the coefficient of the 
Weed attribute does not vary over space. Distance effects on the coefficients 
of the Accessibility attribute are recorded only in models that use the Time 
distance,  probably  because  this  metric  has  more  explanatory  power  than 
geographical  distance  (McConnel  and  Strand,  1981).  These  effects  are 
negative and take either a logarithmic or quadratic form. They indicate that 
less importance is assigned to access as distance from KP increases. With 
the  logarithmic  specification,  distance  never  brings  the  Accessibility 
implicit  price  below  zero  within  the  dataset.  The  results  for  the  Fire 
attributes are more troublesome. Distance effects are not significant in the 
MiL-Time  distance  model.  They  take  a  logarithmic  form  in  the  MuL-
Geographic  distance  model;  in  the  MuL-Time  distance  model,  distance 
enters according to a 3
rd order polynomial. Finally, in the MiL-Geographical 
distance  model,  distance  effects  take  a  4
th  polynomial  shape.  Fires  in 
Australia are a highly emotive issue. Hence, the spatial behaviour of the Fire 
coefficient  could  be  partially  explained  by  recent  fire  episodes  and  the 
different  spatial  distribution  of  risks  of fires.  Unfortunately,  the  distance 
variable is not able to capture this last feature. Indeed, fire risk is connected 
to  weather  patterns  that  clearly  do  not  change  linearly  according  to  the 
distance  from  KP.  The  models,  however,  treat  respondents  living  in  the 
tropical north the same as those living in the Mediterranean-type climate of 
the south. There is clearly some spatial variability that is not captured by the   18 
distance  variable,  as  indicated  by  the  statistically  significant  standard 
deviation of the Fire attribute in the MiL-Geographical distance model.  
 
QLD sample.  
As noted above, the QLD sample is  strongly biased in favour of highly 
educated, wealthy and female individuals. This  is an indication in itself. 
Sampling the QLD population in Brisbane was  a lengthy process; many 
contacted individuals refused to take part in the survey because they did not 
have time for the interview; others simply were not interested in KP. Any 
results from the QLD sample must then be seen in the light of these facts. 
The QLD dataset is analysed separately from the WA dataset because the 
survey format was different between the samples. Further, the QLD sample 
is analysed using both a MuL model and a MiL model, but distance does not 
enter the models because the whole sample was collected in one location. 
Table 5 reports the results for the QLD sample. The MuL and the MiL 
models perform similarly in terms of the Adjusted R
2; also, the estimated 
standard  deviations  of  the  normally  distributed parameters  ─the  attribute 
coefficients─ in the MiL model are not significantly different from zero. 
This indicates that there are no sources of unobserved heterogeneity within 
the  sampled  individuals.  The  coefficient  for  the  SQ  dummy  variable  is 
negative but not  significant. The coefficients of the choice attributes are 
significant. The Weed coefficient has a positive sign ─less weeds is better;   19 
the Fire coefficient has a negative sign ─less fires is better; the coefficient 
for the Accessibility attribute is negative ─reduced accessibility is better.  
 
Comparison of the two samples.  
Assume the KP authority increases the area of weed-free bushland by 20% 
while leaving unchanged accessibility and fire damages. That is, in this new 
management  scenario  only  the  distance-independent  attribute  improves. 
From  each  sample,  take  an  individual  with  the  same  socio-economic 
characteristics ─a university-level education and with a “green” attitude
1; 
the two individuals are similar but they come from different jurisdictions. 
What  is  the  impact  of  the  new  management  strategy  on  their  welfare? 
Welfare effects are given by the difference between the utility associated 
with the status quo V0 and the utility of the new management strategy V1, 
divided  by  the  marginal  utility  of  income  βCOST  (Boxall  et  al.,  1996). 
Welfare changes are calculated using the parameter estimates from the MuL 
and MiL models. Table 6 shows the results. The four models for the WA 
sample estimate a welfare gain that ranges from Aus$5.34 to Aus$7.14 per 
year. Using the geographical distance gives the higher estimates. For the 
QLD sample, the MuL and the MiL models give an estimate of Aus$5.16 
and Aus$9.11 per year, respectively. As previously noted, the MiL model 
for the QLD sample is redundant; it does not perform better than the MuL 
                                                 
1 Environment attitude=1 if the respondent declares governments should spend more money 
on the environment.   20 
model,  and  the  estimated  standard  error  of  the  normally  distributed 
attributes are not statistically significant. Hence, the welfare gains from the 
alternative management scenario for a Queenslander are slightly lower than 
the welfare gains of a Western Australian. This indicates that for individuals 
with strong environmental preferences, jurisdictions do not matter.   
 
Discussion.  
A number of policy-relevant issues can be drawn from the model results. 
First, there are some spatially homogeneous benefits within the WA border. 
If respondents are expressing their true individual welfare gains and losses, 
or  if  they  are  giving  an  assessment  of  welfare  changes  for  a  wider 
community,  their  preferences  indicate  that  the  conservation  of  KP’s 
bushland  determines  benefits  that  spread  to  the  whole  West  Australian 
community. State funding from the WA government is warranted. Second, 
for some attributes and/or for some model specifications, distance drives the 
benefits  to  become  negatives.  Financial  assistance  from  councils  in  the 
proximity of KP would be a good way to increase the equity of the taxation 
system.  Thirdly,  there  is  also  ground  for  contributions  from  inter-state 
residents. These contributions could be in the form of federal transfers or 
simply an access fees to KP for inter-state visitors.  
On  methodological  grounds,  this  application  suggests  that  it  is 
possible to design and implement an environmental valuation study with the   21 
goal of determining the optimal size of a jurisdiction. This issue is largely 
unexplored, and environmental valuation techniques seem to be suited and 
versatile to tackle the task. There are clearly several developments to be 
made. In order to increase response rates from jurisdictions other than the 
one where environmental good is located, new sampling strategies should be 
developed.  Improvements  in  the  definition  of  spatial  variability,  possible 
with a combination of indicators, are also needed.  
 
6. Conclusions. 
Controversies between levels of government on matters of environmental 
policy  design,  implementation  and  enforcement  are  common  and 
widespread. There are several arguments in favour of more efficient federal 
interventions or fairer state/local regulation. In this paper it is argued that 
the relative efficiency, equity and effectiveness of an environmental policy 
depend on the degree of overlapping between the political boundaries and 
the geographical distribution of environmental externalities. The argument 
is discussed with regards to Kings Park (KP), Perth (Western Australia). In 
order to determine the appropriate level of environmental regulation and 
funding, the paper illustrates the use of a Choice Modelling technique to 
determine the effect of distance on the benefits of alternative management 
strategies for KP. The Choice Modelling application is based on the use of 
samples  from  two  jurisdictions,  two  different  distance  metrics,  several   22 
different functional form specifications, and two econometric models.  
The results suggest that federal, state and local funding support for KP 
are all justified. Some benefits from the park are distance-independent or 
distance effects are small, indicating that individuals living as far as 1500 
km from the park still benefit from it. Also, residents of other states could 
benefits  from  improved  management  strategies  for  KP.    For  sampled 
individuals  with  strong  environmental  preferences,  the  crossing  of  a 
jurisdiction  does  not  make  much  difference.  Other  benefits  are  strongly 
affected by distance. This shows that a certain level of local (council level) 
financial support for the park is justified. A funding system for KP based on 
federal,  state  and  local  resources  would  improve  the  equity  of  the  tax 
collection mechanism.  
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Table 1. Attributes, levels and corresponding variables. 
Attributes  Levels  Variable in Model 
Weed-free Bushland (in %)  30, 40 (sq)*, 50, 60  Weed 
Bushland annually destroyed by 
Fire (in %) 
1, 3, 6 (sq)*, 9  Fire 
Bushland accessible to the 
Public (in %) 
25, 50, 75, 100 (sq)*  Acc 
Annual increase on income tax 
(in $) 
0.30 (sq)*, 1, 3, 6  Cost 




Table 2. Distance zones, population and sample shares.  
  Distance 






ZONE 1  0-5 Km  170,945  9.4  33  10.2 
ZONE 2  5-10Km  330,966  18.2  58  17.9 
ZONE 3  10-15 Km  317,817  17.4  55  17.0 
ZONE 4  15-20 Km  223,801  12.3  41  12.7 
ZONE 5  20-30 Km  157,472  8.6  29  9.0 
ZONE 6  30-50 Km  125,513  6.9  22  6.8 
ZONE 7  50-100 Km  78,206  4.3  11  3.4 
ZONE 8  100-150 Km  87,731  4.8  14  4.3 
ZONE 9  150-300 Km  70,587  3.9  13  4.0 
ZONE 10  300-700 Km  97,337  5.3  18  5.6 
ZONE 11  Over 700 Km  162,289  8.9  30  9.3 













































Table 3. Population and sample characteristics.     
  Western Australia  Queensland 
  Population  Sample  Population  Sample 
Gender         
Male (%)  49.8  42.6  48.8  40.5 
Female (%)  50.2  57.4  51.2  59.5 
Average Age  34.3  50.3  35  39.02 
Average  Weekly Income ($)  693.2  989.5  300-399  771.5 
Level of Education         
University (%)  18.5  30.2  36.47  71.43 
Certificate (%)  16.7  14.2  17.59  9.52 
Up to Y12 (%)  13.5  22.2  23.29  7.14 
Up to Y10 (%)  40.3  26.2  18.37  4.76 
Other (%)  10.9  7.1  4.27  7.14   27 
Table 4. Results of model estimation, WA sample. 
  Multinominal Logit    Mixed Logit 
  Time Distance    Geographical 
Distance    Time Distance    Geographical 
Distance 
   Coeff 
P-
value     Coeff 
P-
value     Coeff 
P-
value     Coeff 
P-
value 
SQ  0.16  0.806    0.46  0.460    0.04  0.951    0.60  0.425 
SQ*Envir.Attitude  -0.92***  0.000    -0.91***  0.000    -1.02***  0.000    -1.1***  0.000 
SQ*Ln(INC)  0.12  0.139    0.06  0.394    0.16  0.080    0.09  0.332 
SQ*Educ(=Y12)  -0.00  0.992    -0.04  0.746    0.01  0.923    -0.03  0.871 
SQ*Educ(Cert)  -0.11  0.480    -0.04  0.813    -0.14  0.437    -0.01  0.978 
SQ*Educ(Uni)  0.24*  0.061    0.19  0.118    0.24*  0.098    0.18  0.213 
                       
WEED  0.03***  0.000    0.03**  0.000    0.03***  0.000    0.03***  0.000 
FIRE  -0.09***  0.004    -0.01  0.775    -0.13***  0.000    -0.14***  0.000 
ACCESSIBILITY  -0.001  0.890    0.01***  0.000    0.01***  0.000    0.01***  0.002 
                       
Fire*Distance  -1.432  0.161                -0.47  0.549 
Fire*Distance^2  10.64**  0.038          0.757  0.102    6.663*  0.079 
Fire*Distance^3  -14.53**  0.022                -12.3***  0.029 
Fire*Distance^4                    5.78***  0.021 
Fire*Ln(Distance)        0.025***  0.005             
Access*Ln(Distance)  -0.003**  0.031                   
Access*Distance^2              -0.08***  0.014       
                       
COST  -0.24**  0.000    -0.23***  0.000    -0.24***  0.000    -0.24***  0.000 
Standard Deviation of Random Parameters               
Weed              0.045  0.051    0.058***  0.010 
Fire              0.163  0.183    0.245***  0.017 
Access              0.003  0.744    0.008  0.364 
                       
Observation  1424      1656      1424      1656   
Log Likelihood  -1369.29      -1592.93      -1371.01      -1593.09   
Adjusted R
2  0.078      0.074      0.118      0.120   
                                   
*** significant at 1% 
**  significant at 5% 
*   significant at 10%                         28 
 
 
Table 5. Results of model estimation, QLD sample 
  Multinominal Logit  Mixed Logit 








-0.799  0.600    -0.989  0.689 
SQ*Envir.Attitude 
-0.624  0.203    -1.151  0.193 
SQ*LN(INC) 
0.253  0.215    0.380  0.259 
SQ*Educ(=Y12) 
0.317  0.625    0.293  0.775 
SQ*Educ(Cert) 
-0.232  0.514    -0.333  0.560 
SQ*Educ(Uni) 
-0.634  0.184    -1.191  0.149 
 
   
 
   
WEED 
0.042***  0.000    0.061***  0.007 
FIRE 
-0.136***  0.000    -0.308**  0.049 
ACCESSIBILITY  -0.016***  0.000    -0.023***  0.001 
           
COST  -0.163***  0.001    -0.135  0.127 
Standard Deviation of Random Parameters     
Weed        0.096  0.153 
Fire        0.597  0.102 
Access        0.017  0.397 
           
           
Number of observations  336      336   
Log likelihood    -292.771      -290.198   
Adj R
2  0.112      0.116   
*** significant at 1% 
**  significant at 5% 
*   significant at 10%     
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Table 6. Individual welfare gains from a new KP management strategy. 
Sample  Model   Distance Metric  Welfare Gains      
(in Aus$ per year) 
Time   5.34 
Multinominal  
Geographical   6.37 
Time   5.68 
WA  
Mixed  
Geographical   7.14 
Multinominal      5.16 
QLD  
Mixed     9.11 
 
 
 
 